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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Leotis Brannon Branigh, III, appeals from his judgment of conviction for first 
degree murder, enhanced by the use of a deadly weapon. He asserts that the district 
court erred by granting the State's motion for reconsideration and holding that the 
federal Electronic Communication Privacy Act superceded Idaho Criminal Rule 41 (a), 
erred by admitting unfairly prejudicial photographs of the victim's wounds, and erred by 
failing to conduct a 404(b) analysis of text messages admitted at trial. He also asserts 
that that the prosecutor committed misconduct, rising to the level of fundamental error, 
when he offered facts not supported by .. the evidence during his closing argument and 
that the prosecutor violated his right to due process by failing to correct false testimony 
at trial. Finally, he asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion for a new 
trial because Mr. Branigh establish a Brady violation and because the court applied the 
incorrect standard pursuant to I.C. § 19-2406. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On October 1. 2007, Michael Johnston was shot and killed. (Tr., p.661, Ls.12-
15.) Nobody could ever identify the shooter. (See generally, Tr.) Kendra Parker 
testified that she lived on the southeast corner of 11 th Street and Cedar Avenue in 
Lewiston. (Tr., p.602, Ls.11-17.) At around 10:20 to 10:30, she realized she had 
forgotten some laundry in her car and she went outside to retrieve it. (Tr., p.603, Ls.1-
5.) She saw a white car idling in the intersection. (Tr., p.603, LsA-5.) She watched the 
vehicle and then heard a male voice saying something like, "I'm right here, man, I'm 
right over here." (Tr., p.603, Ls.6-8.) The voice was not confrontational, so she 
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proceeded to her car. (Tr., p.603, Ls.8-10.) She then heard a gunshot and crouched; 
there was a pause of roughly 3-5 seconds, and then 4-5 gunshots in rapid succession. 
(Tr., p.603, Ls.10-14.) She testified that, as she was standing up, she could see the 
light of a gun illuminating the interior of the car through the slats in her fence. 
(Tr., p.603, Ls.14-17.) After the last shot, somebody said, "oh, shit, man," and the car 
then "gently accelerated toward Thain [Street]." (Tr., p.603, Ls.18-22.) She ran inside 
and called 911. (Tr., p.603, Ls.21-22.) Although she was not very good with cars, she 
testified that she believed the white vehicle was a Camaro. (Tr., p.604, Ls.19-21.) This 
happened about 60-70 feet away. (Tr., p.606, Ls.12-13.) 
Brian Hodge testified that on that night, he drove onto 11th Street and saw a car 
up at the "next little alley street," on the right side of the road with its headlights facing 
him. (Tr., p.621, Ls.6-13.) Just after he drove through the intersection, he heard a 
series of gunshots. (Tr., p.621, Ls.20-21.) It sounded like the shots came from a pistol; 
Mr. Hodge saw no muzzle flashes. (Tr., p.622, Ls.12-16.) The car then pulled away to 
the correct side of the road and drove away. (Tr., p.624, Ls.1-4.) He believed that the 
vehicle was a mid-1980's Iroc Camaro with a dent on the front driver's side fender. 
(Tr., p.625, Ls.1-14.) Mr. Hodge also told Corporal Joedy Mundell that he, "saw a male 
suspect just west of the vehicle's location who appeared to be walking or running west 
on Cedar Avenue." (Tr., p.707, Ls.21-23.) 
Doug Bolton testified that on that evening he was watching television with his 
wife and heard gunshots after 10:00. (Tr., p.631, Ls.23-25.) He looked out the window 
and saw muzzle flashes against the house across the street. (Tr., p.632, Ls.11-15.) He 
ran outside and saw Mike Johnston holding his breath; according to Mr. Bolton, 
Mr. Johnston stated that he was shot by a guy in a white car up at the corner. 
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(Tr.,p.632, Ls.11-15.) Mr. Johnston asked Mr. Bolton if he could take him to the 
hospital; Mr. Bolton told him he would call an ambulance and Mr. Johnston sat on the 
porch. (Tr., p.634, Ls.19-25.) The police arrived in approximately 10 to 15 minutes. 
(Tr., p.638, Ls.22-25.) 
Dr. Jay Hunter was working in the emergency room that night. (Tr., p.645, Ls.21-
23.) When Mr. Johnston was brought in, he started IVs, did a chest x-ray, and inserted 
a chest tube to drain the blood. (Tr., p.646, Ls.7-10.) The State submitted, over 
Mr. Branigh's objection, two photographs of bullet wounds and a photograph of the 
drainage from the chest tube. (Tr., p.646, L.15 - p.647, L.11.) Mr. Johnston eventually 
died from "hemorrhagic shock, he bled to death." (Tr., p.651, LA.) The coroner, Gary 
Gilliam, concluded that Mr. Johnston's death was a homicide and the cause of death 
was a gun shot wound to the right chest. (Tr., p.661, Ls.12-15.) 
Mr. Branigh was idenitied as a possible suspect. Desiree Anderson, who had 
been married to Mr. Johnston, met Mr. Branigh in March of 2007. (Tr., pA81, Ls.8-9.) 
She met Mr. Branigh through her sister and thought he was a "really nice guy, really 
easy to talk to." (Tr., pA81, Ls.16-25.) She was divorced from Mr. Johnston at this 
time, but the two of them had discussed getting back together. (Tr., pA79, Ls.6-8.) She 
began dating Mr. Branigh when Mr. Johnston and their children were on a trip to 
Vermont; when he returned, she told him that "he was kind of like a day late and a dollar 
short because I had started seeing someone." (Tr., p.482, Ls.15-17.) Mr. Johnston was 
upset because he came back from his trip wanting to get back together. (Tr., pA82, 
Ls.22-23.) 
Eventually, Ms. Anderson decided to quit seeing Mr. Branigh and try to work 
things out with Mr. Johnston. (Tr., pA87, Ls.10-20.) She stated that she came to this 
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conclusion in August. (Tr., pA90, Ls.12-24.) She went to see Mr. Branigh sometime 
between September 6 and 11 to see how he was doing with the breakup and she ended 
up sleeping with him. (Tr., p.491, Ls.6-11.) Ms. Anderson stated that, after that 
encounter, she did not believe she had communicated with Mr. Branigh with anything 
other than text messages. (Tr., p.491, Ls.21-22.) Ms. Anderson believed that 
Mr. Branigh thought that Mr. Johnston was controlling and abusive to her; she testified 
that Mr. Johnston grabbed her arms one time and that she had once bit him during a 
fight. (Tr., p.492, L.19 - p.493, L.3.) 
Ms. Anderson testified that sometime during the first part of September, she and 
Mr, Branigh got in her car and he would not get out. (Tr., p.496, Ls.1-7.) He said 
something to the effect of, "do you want to get your neck snapped?" and she told him 
that she wasn't going to see him anymore. (Tr., pA96, Ls.12-15.) Someone overheard 
the argument and called the police; the police told her to stay away from him and she 
went home. (Tr., pA97, LsA-10.) 
On October 1, 2007, she had the day off and was sleeping in the afternoon when 
she awoke to pounding on the doors and walls. (Tr., pA99, Ls.19-25.) Mr. Johnston 
was at work. (Tr., pA99, Ls,19-20.) Mr. Branigh was outside knocking on the door and 
would not stop so she eventually called 911. (Tr., p.500, Ls.1-6.) An officer arrived and 
Mr. Branigh left. (Tr., p.500, Ls.5-S.) She called Mr. Johnston, who came home from 
work while she went to the courthouse to pick up papers to file a protection order. 
(Tr., p.500, Ls.5-12.) That evening, Mr. Johnston was walking outside by the house to 
see if Mr. Branigh was coming back in order to document his behavior. (Tr., p.504, 
Ls.13-21.) During the day, Ms. Anderson received text messages from both 
Mr. Johnston's and Mr. Branigh's telephone numbers. (Tr., p.504, Ls.22-25.) At trial 
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the State sought to introduce State's Exhibit 4, a sixty-six page document containing the 
contents of text messages that Ms. Anderson testified she received and sent. 
(Tr., p.510, Ls.1-25; State's Exhibit 4.) Mr. Branigh objected on the basis of IRE 404(b), 
and the district court overruled this objection, stating that "I've also not been cited 
anything particular for 404(b) nature, so that objection is overruled." (Tr., p.515, LS.15-
20.) 
Gina Barton testified that on October 1, 2007, at around 2:30 or 3:00 p.m., she 
saw Mr. Branigh driving around Powers and 10th Street, driving quickly and text 
messaging. (Tr., p.590, LS.8 - p.591, L.23.) She identified the vehicle pictured in 
State's exhibits 9, 10, 11, and 12 as Mr. Branigh's vehicle. (Tr., p.593, Ls.15-20.) 
Dawn Gump testified that on that same evening, she was walking near 11th and Cedar 
and saw an older style Camaro driving erratically toward her. (Tr., p.598, Ls.1-10.) She 
identified the driver as Mr. Branigh and identified the vehicle in State's exhibits 9, 10, 
11, and 12 as Mr. Branigh's vehicle. (Tr., p.598, Ls.14-25.) 
Later on the evening of October 1, Jonathan Coe, a patrolman for the Clarkston 
Police Department, received an alert from dispatch that a vehicle matching the 
descriptions above had just turned off of Red Wolf Bridge onto Highway 12. (Tr., p.674, 
Ls.1-6.) The officer found the vehicle and performed a U-turn to catch up. (Tr., p.677, 
Ls.22-25.) The officer followed the vehicle while waiting for other units to join him. 
(Tr., p.678, Ls.10-14.) Officer Coe testified that he followed the vehicle for a while, but 
at one point, the vehicle, "turned north, [and] he gunned it and he went - he sped up 
quickly." (Tr., p.679, Ls.16-21.) The officer followed the vehicle at speeds up to 70 
miles per hour; after the vehicle drove back into Lewiston, officer Coe was passed by 
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either a Lewiston or Nez Perce County officer and he pulled off, because the chase 
went outside his jurisdiction. (Tr., p.680, Ls.1-18.) 
Corporal Joedy Mundell testified that, after visiting the site of the shooting, he 
joined the pursuit, and that after following the vehicle to Thain Street, he heard shooting. 
(Tr., p.696, Ls.18-25.) Eventually, the vehicle stopped; Mr. Branigh, who was driving 
the vehicle, refused to exit the vehicle. (Tr., p. 697, Ls.8-18.) Mr. Branigh was 
eventually pulled from the vehicle, tased, and placed in handcuffs. (Tr., p.697, Ls.8-23.) 
Mr. Branigh spoke to Corporal Mundell that evening and told him he had been 
driving around extensively throughout the area that day. (Tr., p.701, Ls.10-21.) He told 
the officer that he had been romantically involved with Ms. Anderson but denied that 
there had been any kind of altercation between himself and Mr. Johnston. (Tr., p.701, 
Ls.10-21.) Mr. Branigh did not recall being near the area of 11 th and Cedar between 10 
and 11 p.m. that night, but said it was possible that he had been there. (Tr., p.701, 
Ls.17-21.) On cross-examination, Corporal Mundell acknowledged that Mr. Branigh had 
told him he had been at that area earlier in the day when it was still daylight and that 
later in the evening was driving around elsewhere. (Tr., p.717, Ls.5-22.) He also 
acknowledged that Mr. Branigh told him that he did not know what had happened, and 
that he did not think that Mr. Johnston deserved to die. (Tr., p.720, Ls.13-23.) 
Mr. Branigh told Corporal Mundell that he thought Mr. Johnston was a danger to 
Ms. Anderson, and that he would both die for, and kill for, Ms. Anderson. (Tr., p.702, 
Ls.12-25.) He stated that he had failed to stop for the officers that evening because he 
had been pulled over before when there were no problems and the officers had "pissed 
him off." (Tr., p.702, Ls.19-25.) Corporal Mundell told Mr. Branigh that Mr. Johnston 
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had died and Mr. Branigh cried. (Tr., p.704, Ls.21-22.) No weapons were found on 
Mr. Branigh that evening. (Tr., p.721, Ls.1-6.) 
Officer Brian Birdsell obtained a search warrant for Mr. Branigh's vehicle and 
found no weapons or shell casings. (Tr., p.740, Ls.1-20.) Officer Birdsell found two 
cellular telephones; one matched a phone registered to Mr. Branigh; the other belonged 
to an R. Kelly, and Officer Birdsell never discovered who that person was. (Tr., p.740, 
Ls.14-20.) 
No testing was done for gun powder residue either in the vehicle or on 
Mr. Branigh. (Tr., p.780, L.17 - p.781, L.10.) At trial, Officer Birdsell testified that, "our 
state lab doesn't test gun powder residue." (Tr., p.781, Ls.20-24.) However, during 
closing arguments, the prosecutor made the following representation to the jury: 
The Defendant is likely to make a big deal of the fact that there was no 
gun shot residue testing done. But if you will recall, Lieutenant Birdsell 
told you the lab doesn't do those any more. In fact, the FBI doesn't do 
them any more because they are not reliable. They don't tend to prove 
anything. They result in a false positive. If you find evidence of gun shot, 
all that says is that at some time in the past there was a gun fired. You 
can't identify the gun, which it was anything like that. And so they have 
taken the positive they will no longer do the testing. 
So the fact that there is the potential to do things, and in this case there 
wasn't, but if there is a potential to do things you might see on CSI, you 
know, did we do a DNA analysis on the blood drops on the sidewalk, no. 
You know, No.1, it takes over a year in real world time to get the DNA 
evidence back. 
(Tr., p.1 023, L.25 -p.1024, L.17.) During rebuttal, he said more: 
GSR (gun shot residue) transfer is one of the biggest problems that makes 
it unreliable. And its situations where there is gunshots, it's highly likely 
that there's more than one gun involved. So if they found gun shot 
residue, it wouldn't have said anything. 
There is no way that we could have introduced evidence to say that that 
was a result of the revolver that he used to kill Michael Johnston any more 
than it was evidence that it was GSR transfer from all the - well, as a 
matter of fact, I mean here's a - every officer in every car has got gun shot 
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residue sitting around. I mean it just becomes a mess. Everyone of them 
takes qualification practice, their guns have it on them. They handle their 
guns. All of them have their guns drawn at this time. The weapons that 
are in their car have gun shot residue. Its just - you know, it's just 
unreliable evidence. So it would not have proven anything for the 
Defendant regardless of what he says. 
(Tr., p.1040, Ls.7-22.) None of this is supported by evidence adduced at trial. 
Officer Birdsell also investigated the scene of the shooting. There was a 
distance of 284 feet from where Ms. Parker saw the vehicle and where Mr. Hodges 
drove by the white vehicle. (Tr., p.745, Ls.15-17.) Mr. Johnston's blood trail did not 
begin at the intersection, but began down the street at 1034 Cedar Avenue. (Tr., p.745, 
Ls.8-9.) State's exhibit 42 was offered as an aerial depiction of these areas and 
distances. (State's Exhibit 42.) 
Officer Birdsell next testified he met Steven Peak in mid-2007 while investigating 
commercial burglaries throughout Lewiston. (Tr., p.757, Ls.3-5.) Mr. Peak was charged 
with possession of stolen property based on Officer Birdsell's investigation. (Tr., p.757, 
Ls.11-13.) Officer Birdsell also sought Mr. Peak's cooperation in the burglary cases and 
Mr. Peak supplied him with reliable information. (Tr., p.758, Ls.9-11.) Mr. Peak 
received a benefit from his cooperation in that the judge in a juvenile matter told him his 
cooperation would be given consideration in a probation violation proceeding. 
(Tr., p.758, Ls.18-24.) 
On February 21, 2008, Officer Birdsell was contacted by a jailer at the Nez Perce 
County Jail, who advised him that Mr. Peak wanted to speak with him. (Tr., p.759, LS.7-
12.) During the subsequent conversation, Mr. Peak described a series of conversations 
he claimed he had had with Mr. Branigh. (Tr., p.759, Ls.14-23.) As a result of those 
discussions, Officer Birdsell arranged for a meeting with him, Mr. Peak, Sergeant Jeff 
Arneson, and the prosecutor in this case, Dan Spickler. (Tr., p.760, Ls.17-24.) Officer 
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Birdsell told Mr. Peak that he would "talk to the judge and tell him that he was being 
cooperative and helping us in another investigation." (Tr., p.761, Ls.19-20.) When 
Mr. Branigh asked Officer Birdsell if he was aware that Mr. Peak had some interaction 
with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the prosecutor objected on the basis that the 
question was outside the scope of direct examination. (Tr., p.787, Ls.12-20.) 
Ryan Harger, the custodian of records for Sprint Nextel in Overland Park, 
Kansas, testified in order to authenticate the records obtained from Sprint. (Tr., p.788, 
L.10 - p.805, L.2.) Mr. Branigh objected on the bases of relevance, IRE 404(b), and 
undue prejudice, IRE 403. (Tr., p.804, Ls.11-18.) The court overruled the objections, 
and the records were admitted as State's Exhibit 64. (Tr., p.805, Ls.1-2.) 
Officer Brandon Hopple, of the Lewiston Police Department, testified that he 
gathered information relating to Mr. Branigh's, Ms. Anderson's, and Mr. Johnston's 
cellular telephones; according to Officer Hopple, messages were received on 
Mr. Johnston's phone from the number associated with Mr. Branigh's phone until 
October 3, 2007, two days after Mr. Johnston's death and Mr. Branigh's arrest. 
(Tr., p.818, Ls.1-23.) Officer Hopple testified that he could not say the messages were 
physically there when he seized Mr. Johnston's phone; the phone had lost power and 
needed to be recharged, and once it was charged, the messages appeared. 
(Tr., p.821, Ls.5-8.) 
Steven Peak then testified that he became acquainted with Mr. Branigh while 
they were incarcerated. (Tr., p.874, Ls.1-11.) The first thing they talked about was the 
fact that Mr. Peak had taken pictures of Mr. Branigh the night he was arrested. 
(Tr., p.874, Ls.19-20.) Mr. Peak testified that, eventually, Mr. Branigh discussed 
"conspiracy theories" about Mr. Johnston's death - theories about how the police or 
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Ms. Anderson were responsible. (Tr., p.876, Ls.10-13.) Mr. Peak stated that 
Mr. Branigh told him that Ms. Anderson had told him they only way he and 
Ms. Anderson could be together was if Mr. Johnston was out of the picture and that the 
only reason she was still with Mr. Johnston was because of the kids. (Tr., p.876, Ls.16-
22.) Mr. Peak claimed that Mr. Branigh told him that the medical authorities did not 
know which wound was the entrance wound and which wound was the exit wound, and 
that, "he was the one that knew the answer." (Tr., p.878, Ls.7-11.) Mr. Branigh also 
allegedly stated that Mr. Johnston "doesn't look so tough frozen in a body bag." 
(Tr., p.879, L.25 - p.880, L 1.) 
Regarding text messages sent the evening of Mr. Johnston's death, Mr. Peak 
testified that Mr. Branigh stated that he thought Ms. Anderson might have been texting 
him from Mr. Johnston's phone when he thought he was texting Mr. Johnston, and he 
noted that while a witness claimed she had seen his car from over a fence line, she 
would not have been able to see his car from there. (Tr., p.881, Ls.16-24.) Further, 
according to Mr. Peak, Mr. Branigh told him that he "went up the old spiral highway 
around a corner," and buried his gun there. (Tr., p.882, Ls.6-9.) However, the police 
searched this area and no guns were ever found. (Tr., p.936, Ls.12-25.) In fact, 
nothing associated with firearms at all was even found at Mr. Branigh's residence. 
(Tr., p.974, Ls.8-14.) 
Mr. Peak stated that Mr. Branigh told him that he had drinks with Mr. Johnston 
once and Mr. Johnston asked Mr. Branigh to kill him and bury him in the woods 
because he was depressed and wanted to die. (Tr., p.884, Ls.7-12.) Mr. Branigh also 
asked Mr. Peak if he knew what euthanasia was and if it was legal in Idaho. (Tr., p.884, 
Ls.15-24.) 
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Mr. Peak testified that as Mr. Branigh was showing him pictures of the scene of 
the shooting, Mr. Branigh noted how there were hearts on the brick tiles and that it 
would be a good place to die. (Tr., p.885, Ls.2-10.) Mr. Branigh also allegedly stated 
that he had always wondered what would go through a person's mind right before he 
died, and that he wished he would have "stuck around." (Tr., p.885, Ls.6-10.) At one 
point, Mr. Peak claimed that he told Mr. Branigh that he thought Mr. Branigh had told 
him that his phone was stolen, and Mr. Branigh smiled and said, "it was." (Tr., p.885, 
Ls.12-1?) When Mr. Peak asked Mr. Branigh what happened on the night of 
Mr. Johnston's death, Mr. Branigh, "told me that when he was driving home a car came 
behind him, and he continued to drive. And he didn't - he didn't say - he didn't really 
say why he didn't stop really. Not that I - he just went into it like just was the next thing, 
just that he was driving away from the police." (Tr., p.886, Ls.10-18.) Mr. Branigh 
allegedly told him that that he wanted to drive to an area where there would be 
cameras, because he believed the police would try to shoot him, and that he would 
drive toward his father's house because his father wanted to see him die. (Tr., p.88?, 
Ls.1-5.) Mr. Branigh allegedly said that he purchased high octane gas because it would 
make his car go faster. (Tr., p.888, Ls.1-2.) When asked why he was testifying, 
Mr. Peak stated that he felt like something wrong was done and it was the right thing to 
do. (Tr., p.888, Ls.12-15.) 
On cross-examination, when asked if he knew Jim Dorian, Mr. Peak replied, "he 
was the resource officer at my school." (Tr., p.891, Ls.1-5.) When asked if he had 
spoken to an FBI Agent Hart about this case, Mr. Peak stated that he had spoken to him 
about "an incident with a laser and an airplane," and that he brought up this case with 
Agent Hart, who stated he was not there for that. (Tr., p.896, Ls.9-20.) The prosecutor 
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objected to this line of questioning as irrelevant and beyond the scope of direct 
examination. (Tr., p.896, Ls.19-25.) The court overruled the objection, and Mr. Peak 
stated that Agent Hart made it clear that he did not want any details about this case 
discussed with him. (Tr., p.897, Ls.12-19.) 
Mr. Branigh was charged with one count of murder in the first degree and one 
count of eluding. (R., p.64.) The State sought an enhancement for the use of a firearm 
or a deadly weapon. (R., p.66.) Mr. Branigh moved to sever the eluding charge; the 
district court granted this motion. (R., pp.76, 147.) 
Mr. Branigh filed a First Motion in Limine, seeking to exclude any evidence 
gathered from the Spring Nextel Corporation concerning his cell phone records. 
(R., p.306.) He asserted that his 4th and 14th Amendments rights, as well as his rights 
pursuant to Article I § 17 of the Idaho Constitution, were violated. (R., pp.306-07.) He 
asserted that the State: 1) served an Idaho search warrant out-of-state; 2) served an 
invalid search warrant in the wrong state; and 3) illegally served a search warrant and 
filed a return before the search warrant was filed with the Court. (R., p.307.) He filed a 
memorandum in support of the motion. (R., pA96.) 
The district court granted the motion and excluded the evidence. (R., p.754.) 
The State then filed a motion for reconsideration. (R., p.763.) The court reconsidered 
its decision and denied the motion in limine. (Tr., p.231, Ls.9-13.) 
Mr. Branigh filed a Second Motion in Limine, seeking to exclude any prior acts 
evidence without first obtaining permission of the court outside the presence of the jury. 
(R., p.531.) The court granted this motion. (Tr., p.183, LsA-22.) 
Mr. Branigh was found guilty of first degree murder. (R., p.941.) The jury also 
found that he used a firearm in the commission of the crime. (R., p.942.) The district 
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court imposed a determinate life sentence for murder and fifteen years determinate for 
use of the firearm. (R, p.1070.) Mr. Branigh appealed. (R, p.1082.) 
Following his sentencing, Mr. Branigh filed a motion seeking a new trial based 
upon new evidence that Mr. Branigh alleged was withheld by the State in violation of 
Brady v. Maryland. 1 (R., p.1 088; Supp. R, pp.197-208.) In conjunction with his motion, 
Mr. Branigh requested that the State produce a copy of "any and all reports from the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Idaho State Police and any other law enforcement 
agency regarding Stephen Peak, Jim Dorion and Dan Spickler." (Supp. R, p.28.) The 
State resisted this request and filed a motion for a protective order, claiming that the 
information that Mr. Branigh was seeking was irrelevant and not related to any purpose 
relating to his motion for a new trial. (Supp. R, p.31.) The prosecutor, Daniel Spickler, 
further claimed that all materials in the State's possession had already been disclosed 
to Mr. Branigh; that the investigation of former Sheriff Dorion was not related to 
Mr. Branigh's case; and that the prosecutor's office was not involved in the investigation 
of the former Sheriff. (Supp. R, pp.31-32.) The district court denied the State's motion 
for a protective order and ordered the State to turn over the information requested by 
Mr. Branigh. (Supp. R, pp.41-44.) 
During the pendency of Mr. Branigh's motion for a new trial or for reconsideration 
of the denial of his prior request for a new trial, his trial counsel sought to withdraw from 
his representation of Mr. Branigh due to an alleged deterioration of the attorney-client 
relationship. (Supp. R., pp.170-171.) As a result of this request, the district court 
appointed Mr. Branigh a new attorney to assist him in presenting his motion for a new 
trial. (Supp. R, pp.173-174.) 
1 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
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Through his newly appointed counsel, Mr. Branigh filed a brief in support of his 
motion for a new trial. (Supp. R, p.197.) He noted within this brief that, prior to trial, he 
had specifically requested that the State disclose to the defense all exculpatory 
information and all material required to be disclosed under Brady. (Supp. R, p.19S.) 
Despite this request, Mr. Branigh noted that none of the information regarding 
Mr. Peak's special relationship with former Sheriff Dorion was ever disclosed to the 
defense, nor was the fact that Mr. Peak apparently had special access through Dorion 
to law enforcement databases. (Supp. R., pp.19S-200.) 
In his brief, Mr. Branigh argued that the failure to disclose information regarding 
Mr. Peak's involvement with former Sheriff Dorion, along with information that Mr. Peak 
had special access to a law enforcement database, constituted a Brady violation that 
entitled Mr. Branigh to a new trial. (Supp. R, pp.201-202.) In the alternative, 
Mr. Branigh asserted that this constituted newly discovered evidence pursuant to 
I.C. § 19-2406(7), that entitled him to a new trial. (Supp. R, pp.202-20S.) 
Mr. Spickler thereafter filed a motion asking that the district court quash the 
subpoenas that were issued for himself and a member of the support staff of the Nez 
Perce County Prosecutor's Office, who were both present for a meeting with federal 
agents regarding Mr. Peak's involvement with former Sheriff Dorion. (Supp. R, pp.214-
371-394.) The prosecutor asked, in the alternative, to be permitted to continue to 
represent the State in Mr. Branigh's case even if he were to be called as a witness in 
the case. (Supp. R., pp.373-374.) 
The district court held a hearing on the State's motion seeking to quash the 
subpoenas for the prosecutor and one of his staff members. (Supp. Tr., p.6, Ls.2-11.) 
At this hearing, Mr. Spickler characterized the reports he had received from Nez Perce 
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law enforcement regarding the involvement between Mr. Peak and former Sheriff Dorion 
as "rumors," and, further, took the position "that rumors can never rise to the level of a 
Brady violation." (Supp. Tr., p.7, Ls.10-18.) The prosecutor classified defense 
counsel's efforts to obtain the prosecutor's testimony as, "just a fishing expedition," 
despite evidence that Mr. Spickler himself: approached federal agents with concerns 
about the relationship between Mr. Peak and former Sheriff Dorion; expressed his own 
concerns about this relationship, along with those of other law enforcement agents; 
provided federal agents with a list of names of people who could provide information 
about this improper relationship; and agreed with the federal agent that this information 
was so serious that the "proper action" was to request that the Idaho State Attorney 
General's Office "take over the matter for potential prosecution." (Supp. Tr., p.9, Ls.2-6; 
Supp. R., pp.214-216.) 
The district court disagreed with the State's characterization of the subpoenas as 
a "fishing expedition," in light of the fact that Mr. Branigh had raised a potential Brady 
violation among his grounds for requesting a new trial. (Supp. Tr., p.18, Ls.6-12.) The 
court particularly noted that the potential knowledge of Mr. Spickler, as the prosecutor in 
Mr. Branigh's case, was among the issues at stake in such a claim. (Supp. Tr., p.18, 
Ls.12-20.) Accordingly, the district court denied the State's motion to quash the 
subpoenas issued by Mr. Branigh, but granted Mr. Spickler's request to remain on the 
case and to continue to represent the State. (Supp. Tr., p.19, L.5 - p.20, L.6.) 
Mr. Spickler eventually testified at the hearing on Mr. Branigh's motion for a new 
trial. (Supp. Tr., p.35, Ls.13-19.) He testified that he was the head of the Nez Perce 
County Prosecutor's Office, as well as the prosecutor for Mr. Branigh's underlying 
criminal case. (Supp. Tr., p.35, Ls.16-24.) According to Mr. Spickler, he had informed 
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federal agents who were investigating former Sheriff Dorion about reports that he had 
received regarding Mr. Peak being given access to a law enforcement database through 
former Sheriff Dorion. (Supp. Tr., p.37, L.17 - p.38, L2.) Mr. Spickler also confirmed 
that a number of people had spoken to him at that time about the close personal 
relationship between Mr. Peak and the former Sheriff. (Supp. Tr., p.38, Ls.3-6.) 
Following this meeting with federal agents, Mr. Spickler was aware that there was an 
on-going investigation of former Sheriff Dorion that directly involved Mr. Peak. (Supp. 
Tr., p.39, Ls.18-24.) 
It was about three months after the meeting between Mr. Spickler and a federal 
agent that Mr. Peak approached the State and offered to testify against Mr. Branigh at 
trial. (Supp. Tr., p.40, Ls.3-25.) Mr. Spickler was aware at this time that Mr. Branigh 
had specifically requested disclosure of all Brady material as part of his discovery 
request. (Supp. Tr., p.41, Ls.1-23.) However, Mr. Spickler did not reveal this 
information about Mr. Peak because the prosecutor characterized the information he 
had obtained as "a rumor" which the prosecutor did not believe qualified as Brady 
material. (Supp. Tr., p.41, L.24 - p.42, L.2.) 
Mr. Spickler did not request that the federal agencies involved in investigating 
former Sheriff Dorion provide any documentation or forward any requests for discovery 
on Mr. Branigh's behalf until after Mr. Branigh filed his motion for a new trial following 
his conviction. (Supp. Tr., p.42, Ls.6-20.) This was despite the fact that Mr. Spickler 
was aware of this investigation prior to and during Mr. Branigh's trial. (Supp. Tr., p.42, 
Ls.21-25.) The prosecutor also asserted his personal belief that impeachment evidence 
is not considered Brady material unless the impeachment evidence "leads to 
exculpatory evidence." (Supp. Tr., p.49, L.19 - p.50, L.2.) 
16 
Mr. Branigh then called Officer Charlie Spencer, who is an investigations 
lieutenant with the Idaho State Police, to the witness stand. (Supp. Tr., p.51, L.18 -
p.52, L.6.) Officer Spencer was involved in the investigation of former Sheriff Dorion. 
(Supp. Tr., p.52, Ls.14-25.) In this capacity, the officer testified that his initial 
involvement was to obtain permission "both from our agency and from the Nez Perce 
County Prosecutor Dan Spickler for us to move forward with the investigation." (Supp. 
Tr., p.52, Ls.19-24.) Officer Spencer testified that he was present at the meeting 
between federal agents and Mr. Spickler regarding the relationship between Mr. Peak 
and former Sheriff Dorion. (Supp. Tr., p.53, Ls.1-11.) 
The officer further testified that Mr. Spickler was informed of the investigation into 
Mr. Peak and the former Sheriff at this meeting. (Supp. Tr., p.53, Ls.12-25.) 
Mr. Spickler personally provided information to both Officer Spencer and to the federal 
agent investigating the case. (Supp. Tr., p.54, Ls.12-14.) According to Officer 
Spencer's testimony, the investigation of the relationship between former Sheriff Dorion 
and Mr. Peak was part of a confidential investigation during the pendency of 
Mr. Branigh's trial. (Supp. Tr., p.54, L.15 - p.55, L.15.) Therefore the officer testified 
that he was unaware of any way that Mr. Branigh could have learned of the information 
that was revealed through this investigation, including the allegation that Mr. Peak had 
been granted access to a law enforcement database through his connection with former 
Sheriff Dorion. (Supp. Tr., p.56, L.16 - p.57, L.2.) 
Another detective with the Idaho State Police, Edward Westbrook, also testified 
at the hearing on Mr. Branigh's motion for a new trial. (Supp. Tr., p.60, LsA-9.) As with 
Officer Spencer, the detective was involved with the investigation into the relationship 
between former Sheriff Dorion and Mr. Peak. (Supp. Tr., p.60, Ls.12-21.) In 
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conjunction with this investigation, Detective Westbrook was aware that Mr. Peak had 
made numerous phone calls to former Sheriff Dorion. (Supp. Tr., p.62, L.11 - p.70, 
L.6.) Many of these conversations involved either requests on the part of Mr. Peak for 
the former Sheriff to assist Mr. Peak in avoiding prison time or actual references to 
Mr. Branigh's case. (Supp. Tr., p.63, L.19 - p.70, L.6; Supp. Ex., pp.69-76.) Notably, 
two of these phone conversations involved discussions of Mr. Peak being placed in the 
same jail cell as Mr. Branigh; and, in one conversation, the former Sheriff instructed 
Mr. Peak not to discuss matters relating to Mr. Branigh on the phone. (Supp. Ex., p.76.) 
Former Sheriff Dorion had previously warned Mr. Peak about the fact that their 
conversations while he was incarcerated were being recorded. (Supp. Ex., p.69.) 
Mr. Peak also testified at this hearing. (Supp Tr., p.79, Ls.17-19.) When asked 
about his relationship with former Sheriff Dorion, Mr. Peak characterized Mr. Dorion as 
his friend. (Supp. Tr., p.80, Ls. 16-19.) He further testified that, contrary to his 
testimony at trial, the two were more than mere acquaintances. (Supp. Tr., p.80, Ls.20-
24.) In the course of this friendship, Mr. Peak testified, he made several phone calls 
and met privately with the former Sheriff more times than he could recall. (Supp. 
Tr., p.81, L.5 - p.86, L.19.) During these phone calls, Mr. Peak would ask former 
Sheriff Dorion for help in avoiding prison for Mr. Peak's charged crimes. (Supp. 
Tr., p.83, Ls.13-17.) At the end of at least one of these conversations, Mr. Peak and 
former Sheriff Dorion both stated, "I love yoU.,,2 (Supp. Tr., p.84, Ls.16-19; Supp Ex., 
p.72.) 
2 Former Sheriff Dorion actually ended several of these recorded phone conversations 
by expressing his love for Mr. Peak. (Supp. Ex., pp.69-70, 72.) 
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Mr. Peak also admitted that he and the former Sheriff had conversations 
regarding Mr. Branigh. (Supp. Tr., p.87, Ls.1-3; Supp. Ex., p.76.) In one of the 
recorded phone conversations, former Sheriff Dorion cut Mr. Peak off after he 
mentioned Mr. Branigh and cautioned Mr. Peak not to say anything about Mr. Branigh 
on the phone. (Supp. Tr., p.87, Ls.11-21; Supp. Ex., p.76.) The former Sheriff said that 
he would try to help Mr. Peak avoid prison. (Supp. Tr., p.88, L.20 - p.89, L.1.) 
During the course of this hearing, Mr. Peak admitted to having lied to federal 
agents about whether he had personally accessed the law enforcement database. 
(Supp. Tr., p.89, L.12 - p.98, L.9.) He admitted at the hearing that he had actually been 
able to access the law enforcement database for the Nez Perce County Sheriff's Office 
on his own "over a dozen times." (Supp. Tr., p.89, Ls.12-23.) Although he was not 
given a password for this database, Mr. Peak would simply use the system whenever 
another police officer had left the program open on a computer. (Supp. Tr., p.90, LS.7-
17.) Mr. Peak was familiar enough with the system that he was able to navigate the 
database on his own. (Supp. Tr., p.90, Ls.15-17.) He did, however, continue to deny 
that he looked up information about Mr. Branigh's case using the database or that his 
testimony was based upon information other than that provided to him by Mr. Branigh. 
(Supp. Tr., p.91, L.14 - p.96, L.12.) 
Finally, Mr. Branigh testified in support of his motion requesting a new trial. 
(Supp. Tr., p.99, Ls.4-7.) He testified that the first time that he learned of the special 
relationship between former Sheriff Dorion and Mr. Peak was after he had already been 
sentenced for murder when he received a newspaper article from his former trial 
counsel. (Supp. Tr., p.99, L.10 - p.100, L.3.) Mr. Branigh did not receive these 
materials until November, 2009. (Supp. Tr., p.101, Ls.1-10.) 
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The State then presented the testimony of Officer Birdsell. (Supp. Tr., p.102, 
Ls.19-21.) Officer Birdsell testified that he was aware of the allegations that Mr. Peak 
had personally accessed the law enforcement database at the Sheriff's office and had 
investigated these allegations. (Supp. Tr., p.103, L.23 - p.104, L.6.) The officer 
testified that, upon reviewing the information contained in the law enforcement 
database, much of the information provided by Mr. Peak was not contained on the 
database. (Supp. Tr., p.103, L.23 - p.112, L.6.) The officer also testified about a letter 
written by Mr. Branigh, which was admitted into evidence at this hearing, in which 
Mr. Branigh acknowledged making statements to Mr. Peak regarding his case, but 
claimed that he made the statements up in order to mislead the police. (Supp. 
Tr., p.120, L.22 - p.122, L.22.) 
The district court initially took Mr. Branigh's motion for a new trial under 
advisement, but subsequently denied it. (Supp. Tr., p.146, Ls.22-24; Supp. R, pp.467-
480.) However, in the district court's order, it actually merged its analysis of whether 
Mr. Branigh was entitled to a new trial in light of the Brady violation that occurred in this 
case with the standards for whether he was entitled to a new trial pursuant to I.C. § 19-
2406 - and analyzed the question of whether Mr. Branigh was entitled to a new trial 
based upon whether he had met both sets of standards cumulatively. (Supp. 
R, pp.481.) In addition, the court framed its analysis as to whether Mr. Branigh had 
demonstrated the requisite prejudice in terms of the sufficiency of the remaining 
evidence to support his conviction in finding that Mr. Branigh was not entitled to a new 
trial. (Supp. R, pp.479-480.) 
Thereafter, Mr. Branigh filed a motion seeking reconsideration of the district 
court's denial of his motion for a new trial. (Supp. R, pp.483-484.) In a brief filed in 
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support of this motion, Mr. Branigh noted for the district court that a different standard 
for prejudice applied to his claims pursuant to Brady than those made pursuant to 
I.C. § 19-2406(7). (Supp. R., pp.492-494.) The district court denied this motion, once 
again reiterating the court's belief that, "the remaining evidence is clearly sufficient to 
support the jury's verdict." (Supp. R., pp.517-519.) 




1. Did the district court err by granting the State's motion for reconsideration of its 
decision that the search warrant for Mr. Branigh's cellular phone records was 
unlawfully executed? 
2. Did the district court err by admitting evidence regarding all of the text messages 
in this case because the district court failed to conduct an IRE 404(b) analysis? 
3. Did the district court err by admitting State's exhibits 32, 33, and 34, because 
their probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice? 
4, Did the prosecutor commit misconduct, rising to the level of fundamental error, 
when he presented argument to the jury that was not supported by evidence 
presented at trial? 
5, Did the prosecutor violate Mr. Branigh's right to due process when the prosecutor 
failed to correct false testimony presented by one of the state's witnesses at trial? 
6. Did the district court err, and and deny Mr. Branigh's due process right to a fair 
trial, when the court denied Mr. Branigh's motion for a new trial based upon the 
Brady violation that occurred in this case? 
7. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Branigh's motion for a new trial 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2406 because the district court failed to apply the correct 
legal standards to this claim? 
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I. 
The District Court Erred By Granting the State's Motion For Reconsideration Of Its 
Decision That The Search Warrant For Mr. Branigh's Cellular Phone Records Was 
Unlawfully Executed 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Branigh asserts that the district court properly concluded that his cellular 
telephone records were inadmissible and erred in granting the State's motion for 
reconsideration and concluding that 18 U.S.C. 2701 et. seq. expanded the scope of an 
Idaho magistrate's authority in authorizing a search warrant. Mr. Branigh contends that 
the warrants were both unlawfully obtained and unlawfully executed, and thus the 
district court's initial decision to suppress the records obtained by the warrant was 
correct. 
B. The District Court Erred By Granting the State's Motion For Reconsideration Of 
Its Decision That The Search Warrant For Mr. Branigh's Cellular Phone Records 
Was Unlawfully Executed 
Prior to trial, Mr. Branigh filed a motion in limine to exclude cell phone records 
obtained from Sprint Nextel Corporate Security. The district court made the following 
factual findings regarding this motion, which Mr. Branigh does not contest on appeal: A 
Lewiston City police officer contacted the local Nextel-Sprint office to inquire about 
obtaining the cell phone records of Mr. Branigh. (R., p.754.) The local office told the 
officer to contact the company's Overland Park, Kansas office where the records are 
stored. (R., p.754.) 
On October 4, 2008, the officer obtained a search warrant from Nez Perce 
County Magistrate Kalbfleisch for the electronically stored cell phone records of 
Mr. Branigh. (R., p.754.) The search warrant listed the premises to be searched as 
Sprint Nextel Corporate Security, Subpoena Compliance, located at 6480 Sprint 
23 
Parkway in Overland Park, Texas (Fax #913-315-0736). (R., p.754.) Upon the 
suggestion of the Kansas office of Nextel-Sprint, which the officer had contacted by 
telephone, the officer faxed the search warrant to the fax number supplied and listed in 
the warrant (R., pp.754-55.) The court took judicial notice that the area code 913 
included Overland Park, Kansas. (R., p.755.) Subsequently, the cell phone records 
were provided by mail to the Lewiston City Police Department. (R., p.755.) However, 
the records failed to include a letter of certification/authenticity so, on November 29, 
2007, the officer obtained a second search warrant from Nez Perce County Magistrate 
Gaskill for the records and a letter of certification/authenticity. (R., p.755.) The second 
search warranted described the premises to be search identically to the first warrant. 
(R., p.755.) The second warrant was then faxed to the fax number on the warrant as 
supplied by Nextel-Sprint. (R., p.755.) 
The district court noted that I.C. § 19-4408 and Idaho Criminal Rule 41 (a) applied 
to Mr. Branigh's claim, and concluded that, "barring authority that supercedes or trumps 
the Rule I.C.R. 41 (a), of which the State has presented none, the Court finds the search 
warrant, while lawfully obtained, was unlawfully executed and, as a result, the cell 
phone records obtained by means of the search warrant were unlawfully obtained." 
(R.. p.756.) "Nevertheless, the Court's ruling does not foreclose admission of the 
Defendant's cell phone records if the State can present records that are shown to be 
lawfully obtained and a proper foundation for the admission of the records is 
established." (R., p.756.) 
The State then filed a motion for reconsideration, asserting that, "authority for 
both Federal and State Courts to issue extra-territorial search warrants is provided by 
18 U.S.C. 2701 et. seq. (the Electronic Communication Privacy Act)." (R., p.765.) 
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Additionally, the State asserted that Mr. Branigh lacked standing to contest the State's 
obtaining of the records because, while, "the records may be about the Defendant, ... 
they do not belong to him." (R., p.769.) 
At the hearing on the State's motion for reconsideration, the district court 
concluded that Mr. Branigh, as "an individual that entered into a cell phone provider 
contract, does have standing to challenge a search warrant seeking the release of cell 
phone records." (Tr., p.230, Ls.12-15.) On this point, Mr. Branigh agrees. However, 
the district court then made the following decision with which Mr. Branigh very much 
disagrees: "I am going to find that 18 USC 27-03 [sic] does provide a means of service 
of a state search warrant to a provider such as Nextel in this case. And I'm therefore 
going to reconsider and reverse my earlier decision." (Tr., p.231, Ls.9-13.) The court 
then denied the motion in limine and permitted the cell phone records to be introduced, 
provided the proper foundation was established. (Tr., p.232, Ls.1-3.) Mr. Branigh 
submits that the district court erred by concluding that 18 U.S.C. § 2703 expanded the 
authority of an Idaho court to issue a warrant beyond that which is provided by Idaho 
law. 
While Mr. Branigh's motion was captioned as a motion in limine, in substance it 
was a motion to suppress, asserting that Mr. Branigh's rights under the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, as well as his rights under Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho 
Constituiton were violated. (R., pp.306-07.) In reviewing an order on a motion to 
suppress evidence, this Court applies a bifurcated standard of review. State v. Purdum, 
147 Idaho 206,207 (2009). This Court will accept the trial court's findings of fact unless 
they are clearly erroneous but will freely review the trial court's application of 
constitutional principles to the facts found. Id. Findings of fact are not clearly erroneous 
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if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence. State v. Bishop, 146 
Idaho 804,810 (2009). 
In this case, Mr. Branigh does not dispute the district court's factual findings, nor 
does he disagree with the court's ruling that he had standing to bring his challenge to 
the execution of the warrant. While Mr. Branigh also does not disagree with the district 
court's initial conclusion that the records were not admissible, he disagrees with its 
rationale. The court held that the warrant was lawfully obtained but was executed 
improperly. (R., pp.755-756.) Mr. Branigh contends that the warrant was unlawfully 
obtained because the magistrate lacked the authority to issue a warrant for premises 
outside of the judicial district in which the magistrate resided. He also asserts that the 
warrant was unlawfully executed because the warrant described the premises to be 
searched as being in Texas, and the warrant was served in Kansas. Mr. Branigh's 
other point of contention is the district court's ruling that the federal statute expanded 
the magistrate's authority to issue a warrant outside the State's jurisdiction. 
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that "[t]he right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
"Article I, Section 17, of the Idaho Constitution is virtually identical to the Fourth 
Amendment, except that 'oath or affirmation' is termed 'affidavit.'" State v. Ramos, 142 
Idaho 628, 630 (Ct. App. 2005). 
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Turning first to the magistrate's authority to issue a warrant for property that is 
located in another state, Idaho Criminal Rule 41 (a) states, 
Authority to issue a warrant. A search warrant authorized by this rule may 
be issued by a district judge or magistrate within the judicial district 
wherein the property or person sought is located upon request of a law 
enforcement officer or any attorney for the state of Idaho. 
I.C.R. 41(a). The rule clearly states that the issuing court must reside within the judicial 
district where the property or person to be sought is located. Regardless of whether the 
premises are in Texas or Kansas, they are outside the judicial district where the warrant 
was sought. As the issuing magistrates lacked any authority to issue warrants outside 
their judicial districts, the warrants were unlawfully obtained. 
Further, the warrants were unlawfully executed, because, as the district court 
found in this case, the search warrant listed the premises to be searched as Overland 
Park, Texas and the warrants were served in Kansas. (R., pp.754-55.) An incorrect 
address for a warrant to search a premise may invalidate a search warrant. Huck v. 
State, 124 Idaho 155, 159 (Ct. App. 1993). And police have a duty under the Fourth 
Amendment to provide the correct "particulars" describing the place to be searched to 
the magistrate. United States v. Collins, 830 F .2d 145, 145-146 (9th Cir. 1987). 
Because the warrants described the premises to be searched as being in Texas, and 
the warrants were served in Kansas, they were unlawfully executed. 
Thus, the warrants were both unlawfully obtained and executed. They were 
unlawfully obtained because the premises being searched were outside the judicial 
district where the warrant was obtained, and they were unlawfully executed because 
they were served in a different State than the State identified in the warrant. Because of 
this, the district court properly ruled the records were inadmissible unless the State 
could subsequently show that they were lawfully obtained. 
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The State's motion for reconsideration did not make this showing. The State's 
sole argument that the records were admissible was that the warrant process in this 
case was made valid by 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a), which provided, 
A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a provider of 
electronic communications service of the contents of a wire or electronic 
communication that is in electronic storage in an electronic 
communications system for one hundred and eighty days or less, only 
pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures described in the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by a court with jurisdiction over the 
offense under investigation or equivalent state warrant. 
18 U.S.C. § 2703(a).3 The State rightfully noted that, "the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure do not apply to state judges or state law enforcement." (R., p.766.) 
However, the State was incorrect in its assertion that 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) had anything 
to do with this case. 
After citing the above-quoted portion of the statute, the State asserted that, "[a] 
rather complete discussion of the reasoning behind the Federal Legislation is given In 
the matter of the Search of, Yahoo, Incorporated, 701 First Avenue, Sunnyvale, 
3 The statute has since been amended to make it even clearer that a different standard 
applies to state courts. It now states, 
A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a provider of 
electronic communication service of the contents of a wire or electronic 
communication, that is in electronic storage in an electronic 
communications system for one hundred and eighty days or less, only 
pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures described in the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the case of a State court, 
issued using State warrant procedures) by a court of competent 
jurisdiction. A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a 
provider of electronic communications services of the contents of a wire or 
electronic communication that has been in electronic storage in an 
electronic communications system for more than one hundred and eighty 
days by the means available under subsection (b) of this section. 
18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2009) (emphasis added). 
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California 94089 (2007 US Dist, Ariz)." (R., p.767.) The State brought the following 
quote to the district court's attention: 
Common sense dictates the result reached herein. Judicial and 
prosecutorial efficiency is better served by permitting the federal district 
court for the district where the crime allegedly occurred to preside over 
both the investigation and prosecution of that crime. Commentators have 
suggested that one reason for the amendments effected by Section 220 of 
the Patriot Act was to alleviate the burden placed on federal district courts 
in the Eastern District of Virginia and the Northern District of California 
where major internet service providers ("ISPs") AOL and Yahoo, 
respectively, are located. See, Paul K. Ohm, Parallel Effect Statutes and 
E-mail "Warrants": Reframing the Internet Swveillance Debate, 72 
Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 1599, 1613-15 (Aug.2004); Patricia L. Bellia, 
Surveillance Law Through eyberlaw's Lens, 72 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 1375, 
1454 (Aug.2004) (stating that the "effect of the change was to shift the 
responsibility for issuance of the order from the court where the service 
provider is located to the court with jurisdiction over the offense being 
investigated; prior to passage of the USA Patriot Act, a disproportionate 
number of such orders were issued in the Eastern District of Virginia, 
where AOL is located."); Franklin E. Fink, The Name Behind the 
Screenname: Handling Information Requests Relating to Electronic 
Communications, 19 No. 11 Computer & Internet Law 1, 6-7 (Nov.2002) 
(stating that "[t]his provision was intended to relieve the burden on district 
courts in which major communications providers are located, such as the 
Northern District of California and Eastern District of Virginia."). Indeed, 
the House Judiciary Committee's Report accompanying the USA Patriot 
Act explains that § 2703(a) "attempts to address the investigative delays 
caused by the cross-jurisdictional nature of the Internet." Paul K. Ohm, 
Parallel Effect Statutes and E-mail "Warrants": Reframing the Internet 
Surveillance Debate, 72 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. at 1614-15, n. 80 (Aug.2004) 
(citing H.R.Rep. No. 107-236, pt. 1 at 57 (2001)). The Committee's Report 
further explains that requiring an investigator to coordinate with agents, 
prosecutors, and judges in the district where the ISP is located would 
cause time delays that "could be devastating to an investigation, 
especially where additional criminal or terrorists acts are planned." Id. 
(emphasis added). Additionally, requiring an Arizona federal agent 
investigating a crime committed in Arizona to travel to California or Virginia 
to obtain an out-of-district search warrant from a California or Virginia 
magistrate judge for electronically-stored communications WOUld, in my 
view, unnecessarily increase the cost of federal investigations. 
In re Search of Yahoo, Inc., 07-3194-MB, 2007 WL 1539971 (D. Ariz. May 21,2007). 
This is all well and good, but it has absolutely nothing to do with whether Congress can 
expand the warrant issuing power of an Idaho court. It is clear from the above quote 
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that the federal legislation was indeed aimed at streamlining the warranting process and 
decreasing the costs - of federal investigations and prosecutions. What the Arizona 
court was discussing was permitting a federal court in one federal district to issue a 
warrant in another federal district. Id. This has absolutely nothing to do with the 
question of whether Congress can alter the warrant issuing power of a state court. 
Further, the federal legislation does not even intend to alter state warranting 
procedures in the manner in which the State suggested to the district court. The statute 
clearly permits a governmental entity to apply for a warrant, "issued using the 
procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by a court with 
jurisdiction over the offense under investigation or equivalent state warrant." 18 
U.S.C. § 2703(a) (emphasis added). Thus, the warrant must comply with the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure by a court with jurisdiction over the offense (the section 
that applies to the federal courts), or be an "equivalent state warrant," i.e., a state 
warrant that complies with a state's warrant issuing procedure (the section that applies 
to a state warrant.) Because the federal legislation does not attempt to expand a 
State's warrant issuing power, but rather orders the provider of electronic 
communications services to comply with a state warrant, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) does not 
provide authority for a Nez Perce County magistrate to issue a warrant for premises in 
Kansas or Texas. 
Further, even if Congress intended to alter each state's criminal rules of 
procedure, it would lack the power to do so. This Court should take umbrage at the 
suggestion that Congress could, by federal legislation, do away with the Idaho Criminal 
Rules. It is this Court, not Congress, that promUlgates the Idaho Criminal Rules. 
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I.C.R.1. These rules are invalid only to the extent they ever violate the United States or 
Idaho Constitution. However, in the district court, the State asserted, 
"[I]est there be any confusion about the referenced statute's applicability to 
the states, the Court's opinion in Ameritech v. McCann, 403 F.3d 908; 
2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 5941 discusses the issue regarding the applicability 
of the ECPA to the states (in the context of 18 USC 2706, which deals 
with the requirement that governmental entities are responsible for the 
costs incurred by the service provider.) 
(R., p.768). In McCann, the Seventh Circuit stated, 
"A governmental entity" is considerably broader than "the federal 
government." The point of § 2706 is not to distinguish the federal 
government from other governments, but to distinguish the public from the 
private sector. Any private actor who wants information from a phone 
company will have to negotiate and pay for the service, when § 2702 
allows disclosure at all. Governments have a power of compulsion, and § 
2706 attaches a price tag to the use of that power, just as the 
Constitution's takings clause requires compensation for other uses of 
governmental power to obtain private property. 
Although the Electronic Communications Privacy Act does not define the 
term "governmental entity," it uses that phrase in several sections in ways 
that make application to state and local governments unmistakable. For 
example, § 2703 specifies how a "governmental entity" can go about 
obliging a phone company to hand over records. The statute gives 
examples, such as "an administrative subpoena authorized by a Federal 
or State statute or a Federal or State grand jury or trial subpoena", § 
2703(b)(1 )(8)(i). Other options include a "State warrant" (referred to in 
three subsections) and a "Federal or State grand jury or trial subpoena" (in 
§ 2703(c)(2)). Then there is § 2703(d), which distinguishes what "a 
State governmental authority" must do from how a federal 
governmental body proceeds, an odd reference indeed if the 
category "governmental entity" does not include states. 
Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 403 F.3d 908, 912-13 (7th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). 
Mr. 8ranigh does not assert that Idaho is not a "governmental entity," under the Act, but 
it is one thing to assert that a governmental entity that seeks to use the authority of the 
Act must compensate the provider, and quite another to assert that the entire Act 
supercedes the Idaho Criminal Rules. However, the McCann case provided by the 
State does answer the question posed by this case - the Act preserves State 
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sovereignty. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), cited by the McCann Court, provides: H[i]n the case of 
a State governmental authority, such a court order shall not issue if prohibited by the 
law of such State." 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). In this case, the warrants were clearly 
prohibited by the laws of Idaho, specifically I.C.R. 41 (a). Further, it was executed on an 
address different than the address identified in the warrant. 
The district court correctly concluded in its initial order that the phone records 
were inadmissible unless the State could subsequently show that the warrants were 
valid. The State's only argument was the federal statute validated the issuance and 
execution of the warrants. As set forth above, the federal statute does not, and cannot, 
alter the Idaho Criminal Rules. Because the Electronic Communication Privacy Act 
does not apply to the facts of this case, the district court erred by granting the State's 
motion for reconsideration. At trial, evidence of these messages was presentend in 
State's Exhibits 61 and 64; due to the fact that the court erred in granting the motion for 
reconsideration, these specific exhibits should not have been admitted. 
II. 
The District Court Erred By Admitting State's Exhibits 32, 33, And 34 Because Their 
Probative Value Was Substantially Outweighed By The Danger Of Unfair Prejudice 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Branigh asserts that the district court erred by admitting State's Exhibits 32, 
33, and 34 because their probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice. 
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B. The District Court Erred By Admitting State's Exhibits 32, 33, And 34 Because 
Their Probative Value Was Substantially Outweighed By The Danger Of Unfair 
Prejudice 
Dr. Jay Hunter was working in the emergency room the night Mr. Johnston was 
shot. (Tr., p.645, Ls.21-23.) When Mr. Johnston was brought in, Dr. Hunter started IVs, 
took a chest x-ray, and inserted a chest tube. (Tr., p.646, Ls.7-10.) The State 
submitted, over Mr. Branigh's objection, two photographs of bullet wounds and a 
photograph of the drainage from the chest tube. (Tr., p.646, L.15 - p.647, L.11; State's 
Exhibits 32, 33, and 34.) Mr. Branigh objected on the basis that the exhibits were 
unfairly prejudicial pursuant to IRE 403. (Tr., p.647, Ls.12-15.) The district court 
overruled the objection, stating, "although there is some prejudicial impact, I do think 
that the probative value is sufficient that I'm ... going to overrule that objection and 
Exhibits 32, 33, and 34 will be admitted at this time." (Tr., p.647, Ls.21-25.) 
Mr. Branigh submits that the district court erred by admitting the exhibits. 
Mr. Branigh acknowledges that he did not make a relevance objection. However, 
any relevance to these exhibits was extremely low. There was no dispute in this case 
that Mr. Johnston was shot in the chest and there was no dispute that the wounds 
caused his death. The coroner testified, without objection, to those conclusions. The 
only contested issue in this case was whether Mr. Branigh was the shooter. These 
photographs contribute nothing to this issue. The photographs, of bloody bullet wounds 
and a chest tube full of blood, were unfairly prejudicial because they had no effect other 
to appeal to the jury's sympathy. Pursuant to I.R.E. 403, relevant evidence may be 
excluded, "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice." State v. Page, 135 Idaho 214, 219 (2000). The trial court's I.R.E. 403 
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determination is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Enno, 119 Idaho 392, 406 
(1991 ), 
To determine whether the district court's discretion has been abused, this Court 
must ascertain: first, whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one 
requiring the exercise of discretion; second, whether the trial court acted within the outer 
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the 
specific choices available to it; and, third, whether the court reached its conclusion by 
an exercise of reason. Zamora v. State, 123 Idaho 192, 194 (1992) (citing Sun Valley 
Shopping Center v. Idaho Power, 119 Idaho 87, 94 (1991)). Evidence is not unfairly 
prejudicial simply because it is damaging to a defendant's case. State v. Pokorney, 149 
Idaho 459, 465 (Ct. App. 2010). Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when it suggests 
decision on an improper basis. Id. 
As set forth above, the district court did not engage in much of an analysis 
regarding this issue, simply stating, "although there is some prejudicial impact, I do think 
that the probative value is sufficient ... " (Tr., p.647, Ls.21-25.) While the district court 
appears to have perceived the issue as one of discretion, Mr. Branigh asserts that the 
court failed to reach its conclusion through an exercise of reason. As noted above, the 
relevance of the photographs was, at best, minimal and, at worst, nonexistent. There 
was no dispute as to the cause of death in this case, and photographs of bloody 
wounds and a chest tube add nothing of relevance. The only effect the photographs 
would have had was to appeal to the jury's passion by creating sympathy for 
Mr. Johnston because of the state he was in when the photographs were taken. 
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III. 
The District Court Erred By Admitting Text Messages During Desiree Anderson's 
Testimony Because The District Court Failed To Conduct an IRE 404(b) Analysis 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Branigh asserts that the district court improperly admitted evidence of his text 
messages without undertaking the requisite analysis under I.R.E. 404(b) as required by 
law and by the district court's pretrial order in this case. 
B. The District Court Erred By Admitting Text Messages During Desiree Anderson's 
Testimony Because The District Court Failed To Conduct an IRE 404(b) Analysis 
Prior to trial, the district court ruled that, prior to the admission of any Rule 404(b) 
evidence, there would be a hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine the 
relevancy of the evidence. (Tr., p.183, Ls.1-25.) At trial, prior to the admission of a 
series of text messages, Mr. Branigh objected on the basis of IRE 404(b). He made two 
specific objections - to State's Exhibits 4 and 64. (Tr., p.512, L.2-9, p.804, Ls.10-17.) 
Regarding Exhibit 4, the district court stated that Mr. Branigh had not demonstrated the 
messages were subject to 404(b); regarding Exhibit 64, the court simply overruled the 
Rule 404(b) exception. (Tr., p.515, L.15-19, p.804, Ls.18-25.) Because these exhibits 
are lengthy, Mr. Branigh will not list out the messages in this brief. However, he asserts 
that the district court erred by failing to recognize that these messages, many of them 
quite prejudicial, fell within the scope of Rule 404(b) and by failing to determine their 
relevancy outside of the presence of the jury. 
Admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts when offered for a 
permitted purpose is subject to a two-tiered analysis. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 
(2009). First, the trial court must determine whether there is sufficient evidence to 
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establish the other crime or wrong as fact. Id. The trial court must also determine 
whether the fact of another crime or wrong, if established, would be relevant. Id. 
Evidence of uncharged misconduct must be relevant to a material and disputed issue 
concerning the crime charged, other than propensity. Id. Such evidence is only 
relevant if the jury can reasonably conclude that the act occurred and that the defendant 
was the actor. Id. 
Second, the trial court must engage in a balancing under !.R.E. 403 and 
determine whether the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative 
value of the evidence. Id. This balancing is committed to the discretion of the trial 
judge. Id. The trial court must determine each of these considerations of admissibility 
on a case-by-case basis. Id. 
In this case, the district court did not perceive the text messages as falling within 
the cope of Rule 404(b) and, therefore, did not undertake the analysis required of it by 
Grist. Regarding Exhibit 4, Mr. Branigh objected on the basis of Rule 404(b). The 
district court stated that it had not been cited to anything "particular for 404(b)" and 
overruled the objection. (Tr., p.515, Ls.17-1S.) The district court erred. 
Mr. Branigh objected, and alerted the district court to the fact that the messages 
were "404(b) evidence." (Tr., p.512, Ls.5-S.) While the district court stated that it had 
been pointed to nothing in particular regarding Rule 404(b), Mr. Branigh's objection was 
clear. It is also clear that the messages were subject to Rule 404(b). The Court of 
Appeals has recently noted, 
Although Idaho appellate courts have commonly used the terms "prior bad 
acts evidence" or "other bad acts evidence" as shorthand to refer to 
evidence governed by Rule 404(b), we have noted that the rule is not 
limited to "bad" acts. State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 190, 254 P.3d 77, 91 
(Ct.App.2011). We have also held, however, that if the evidence does not 
bear upon the defendant's character, it is not subject to !.R.E. 404(b). Id. 
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In Norton, the defendant was on trial for arson and sought exclusion of 
evidence that she had previously experienced a house fire and collected 
insurance. We held that evidence that Norton's house had burned and that 
she received insurance, without any evidence that the fire was caused by 
arson, did not implicate her character; and therefore was not excluded by 
Rule 404(b). Id. at 190, 254 P.3d at 91. 
In the present case, the State concedes on appeal that evidence of 
Whitaker's pornography viewing could have been perceived by a jury as 
reflecting negatively on his character. We agree. This evidence, while not 
evincing criminality, could be used to demonstrate poor character. 
State v. Whitaker, 152 Idaho 945, 949 (Ct. App. 2012). While the State was not offering 
the text messages from Mr. Branigh's phone as evidence of criminal character, this 
evidence could certainly be used to demonstrate poor character in the form of 
inappropriate comments and threats. The evidence, by its very nature, is clearly within 
the ambit of Rule 404(b) and Mr. Branigh was not required to elaborate any further in 
his objection. 
The text messages from Mr. Branigh's phone were clearly prior acts which could 
reflect poorly on his character, and thus IRE 404(b) is applicable. The district court 
violated its own order, and the command in Grist that the court make factual findings 
regarding whether the act could be proven or where it would be relevant. The district 
court did none of these things, and therefore, the district court erred. 
IV. 
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, Rising To The Level Of A Fundamental Error, 
By Arguing Facts Not In Evidence 
Mr. Branigh asserts that the prosecutor in committed misconduct rising to the 
level of a fundamental error when he argued facts that were not supported by any 
evidence in the record. 
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In cases where the defendant fails to object to prosecutorial misconduct at trial, 
this Court will review the alleged error for whether the misconduct alleged rises to the 
level of a fundamental error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010). In cases of 
unobjected to error, this Court applies a three-step process of review. First, the 
defendant must demonstrate that one or more of his unwaived constitutional rights were 
violated. Id. Second, the error must be clear and obvious from the record without the 
need for additional information not contained within the record on appeal. Id. Finally, 
the defendant must show the error affected the defendant's substantial rights. Id. As to 
this last prong, the defendant must show a reasonable possibility that the error 
complained of affected the outcome of the trial. 
"Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the 
law as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted at trial, including 
reasonable inferences from that evidence, this impacts a defendant's Fourteenth 
Amendment right to a fair trial." Perry, 150 Idaho at 227. The prosecutor in this case 
attempted to induce the jury to render a verdict on factors other than the evidence when 
he discussed the reasons why no testing was done on gun powder residue, none of 
which was supported by the facts adduced at trial. 
During closing arguments, the prosecutor made the following representation to 
the jury: 
The Defendant is likely to make a big deal of the fact that there was no 
gun shot residue testing done. But if you will recall, Lieutenant Birdsell 
told you the lab doesn't do those any more. In fact, the FBI doesn't do 
them any more because they are not reliable. They don't tend to prove 
anything. They result in a false positive. If you find evidence of gun shot, 
all that says is that at some time in the past there was a gun fired. You 
can't identify the gun, which it was anything like that. And so they have 
taken the positive they will no longer do the testing. 
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So the fact that there is the potential to do things, and in this case there 
wasn't, but if there is a potential to do things you might see on CSI, you 
know, did we do a DNA analysis on the blood drops on the sidewalk, no. 
You know, No.1, it takes over a year in real world time to get the DNA 
evidence back. 
(Tr., p.1023, L.25 -p.1024, L.17.) During rebuttal, he stated: 
GSR (gun shot residue) transfer is of the biggest problems that makes it 
unreliable. And its situations where there is gunshots, it's highly likely that 
there's more than one gun involved. So if they found gun shot residue, it 
wouldn't have said anything. 
There is no way that we could have introduced evidence to say that that 
was a result of the revolver that he used to kill Michael Johnston any more 
that it was evidence that is was GSR transfer from all the - well, as a 
matter of fact, I mean here's a - every officer in every car has got gun shot 
residue sitting around. I mean it just becomes a mess. Everyone of them 
takes qualification practice, their guns have it on them. They handle their 
guns. All of them have their guns drawn at this time. The weapons that 
are in their car have gun shot residue. Its just - you know, it's just 
unreliable evidence. So it would not have proven anything for the 
Defendant regardless of what he says. 
(Tr., p.1040, Ls.7-22.) None of this is supported by evidence adduced at trial. 
These statements, calculated to alleviate the jury's concern as to why testing was 
not done, misled the jury regarding the facts. See also State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570 
(Ct. App. 2007) (finding prosecutorial misconduct rising to the level of a fundamental 
error where the prosecutor misstated the evidence, misstated the law, and appealed to 
the passions and prejudice of the jury). 
These due process violations are apparent from the face of the record and are 
clear violations of well-established law. Accordingly, there is every reason to believe 
the prosecutor's improper argument affected the outcome in this case. One of 
Mr. Branigh's arguments at trial was that he did not own a gun, was not found with a 
gun, and no gun was found at the hill where Mr. Peak claimed Mr. Branigh told him that 
he had hidden a gun. The prosecutor was clearly concerned that Mr. Branigh might 
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argue that the lack of gun shot residue testing might sway the jury, because he 
emphasized the lack of evidence of residue in both his initial and rebuttal arguments. 
Considering that a lack of residue on Mr. Branigh could corroborate his assertion that he 
did not own a gun, it cannot be said that the prosecutor's statements did not affect the 
outcome of the trial. The prosecutor clearly committed misconduct and this Court 
should vacate Mr. Branigh's conviction as a result. 
V. 
The Prosecutor Violated Mr. Branigh's Right To Due Process When He Failed To 
Correct False Testimony Presented By One Of The State's Witnesses At Trial 
A. Introduction 
One of the State's primary witnesses at Mr. Branigh's trial, Mr. Peak, testified 
falsely before the jury that his relationship with former Nez Perce County Sheriff Dorion 
was one of mere acquaintance, and that he knew the officer only due to the fact that the 
former Sheriff was a resource officer at Mr. Peak's high school. The prosecutor in this 
case knew, or had reason to know, that this testimony was false but failed to correct the 
testimony at trial. Because this evidence was material to Mr. Branigh's case, he asserts 
that due process requires reversal of his conviction. 
B. Clarification Of Standard Of Review For Mr. Branigh's Claim Of A Due Process 
Violation Due To The Presentation Of False Testimony By One Of The State's 
Witness 
Mr. Branigh concedes that he did not object to the false testimony presented by 
Mr. Peak at trial, as he did not become aware of evidence showing Mr. Peak's 
testimony to be false until after he had already been convicted. Normally a defendant 
raising a claim of prosecutorial misconduct resulting in a due process violation for the 
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first time on appeal must meet the three-part test articulated in Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. 
However, under the unique facts of this case and the distinctive harm that results when 
a defendant is convicted partly through the presentation of false testimony, Mr. Peak 
asserts that this Court should review his claim of a due process violation directly, as he 
could not have raised any objection at trial. 
In most cases where the defendant fails to object to prosecutorial misconduct at 
trial, this Court will review the alleged error for whether the misconduct alleged rises to 
the level of a fundamental error. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. First, the defendant must 
demonstrate that one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were 
violated. Id. Second, the error must be clear and obvious from the record without the 
need for additional information not contained within the record on appeal. Id. Finally, 
the defendant (in most instances) must show the error affected the defendant's 
substantial rights. Id. As to this last prong, the defendant must show a reasonable 
possibility that the error complained of affected the outcome of the trial. 
In Perry, the Idaho Supreme Court adopted the three-part test for unobjected to 
errors, in part, as a matter of policy to encourage the making of timely objections before 
the trial court. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. This policy was adopted both to permit the 
trial court the opportunity to consider claims of error, and to prevent a defendant from 
"sandbagging the court," - i.e., remaining silent regarding his or her objections and only 
belatedly raising the issue if the trial does not result in the defendant's favor. Id. at 224. 
Such a concern is not present under the unique facts of this case, however, because 
Mr. Branigh could not have known that Mr. Peak's testimony was false until after his trial 
had already concluded, as this was the only point in time when the State disclosed the 
evidence that demonstrated its falsity. Accordingly, under the unique facts of this case 
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- where the evidence showing the error is only demonstrated at a stage of the 
underlying criminal proceedings that follows the defendant's trial - Mr. Branigh asserts 
that the three-part test for fundamental error under Perry should not apply and that this 
Court should directly review his claim on appeal. 
However, Mr. Branigh asserts that, even if the three-part test from Perry is 
deemed to apply to his case, this standard has been met given the prosecutor's failure 
to correct false testimony from a key witness for the State. 
C. The Prosecutor Violated Mr. Branigh's Right To Due Process When He Failed To 
Correct False Testimony Presented By One Of The State's Witnesses At Trial 
Mr. Branigh asserts that the prosecutor in this case violated his Fourteenth 
Amendment right to due process at his trial when he knowingly failed to correct false 
testimony that was tendered by Mr. Peak, who was one of the State's witnesses at trial.4 
H[A] conviction that is obtained through the use of false evidence, known to be 
such by representatives of the State, must fall under the Fourteenth Amendment." 
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). The same result is required when the State 
fails to correct false testimony, even if the testimony was unsolicited by the State. Id. In 
addition, it makes no difference if the false testimony is relevant only to impeachment of 
a witness or the credibility of the parties: 
The principle that a State may not knowingly use false evidence, including 
false testimony, to obtain a tainted conviction, implicit in any concept of 
ordered liberty, does not cease to apply merely because the false 
testimony goes only to the credibility of the witness. The jury's estimate of 
the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be 
4 Mr. Branigh's claim of a due process violation through the prosecutor's failure to 
correct false testimony is distinct from his claim of a Brady violation in this appeal. 
While the focus of a claim of a Brady violation is on the evidence that was withheld from 
the defendant, a claim of a due process violation for the failure to correct false testimony 
focuses instead on the nature of the evidence that the jury was permitted to receive. 
See Sivak, 134 Idaho at 649. 
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determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as 
the possible interest of a witness in testifying falsely that a defendant's life 
or liberty may depend. 
Id.; see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-154 (1972); Sivak v. State, 134 
Idaho 641, 649 (2000). 
"A defendant establishes a Napue violation upon showing: (1) the testimony was 
false; (2) the prosecutor knew or should have known it was false; and (3) the testimony 
was materiaL" State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364, 368 (2010). When the credibility of a 
witness may be the determining factor in the jury's finding of guilt or innocence, false 
testimony affecting the witness' credibility justifies a new trial regardless of the good 
faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Sivak, 134 Idaho at 649. Because cases where 
the State knowingly relies upon false evidence in procuring a conviction "involve a 
corruption of the truth-seeking function of the trial process," such a conviction must be 
reversed where there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have 
affected the judgment of the jury. Id. (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 
(1976)). "[T]he fact that testimony is perjured is considered material unless the failure to 
disclose it would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (quoting United States v. 
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,680 (1985)). 
As to the first prong of the test for a Napue violation, the record shows that 
Mr. Peak provided false testimony at Mr. Branigh's trial. During trial, when asked by 
Mr. Branigh what his relationship was with former Sheriff Dorion, Mr. Peak 
characterized the officer as only an acquaintance and further responded that he only 
knew the former Sheriff as, "a resource officer at my high schooL" (Tr., p.890, L.24 -
p.891, L.2.) This testimony was false, as the relationship between the former Sheriff 
and Mr. Peak went far beyond mere acquaintance; and Mr. Peak did not know former 
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Sheriff Dorion as a resource officer from his school, but rather was intimately 
acquainted with the former Sheriff and had used the officer to obtain inside information 
contained in law enforcement databases. 
Mr. Peak subsequently admitted at the hearing on Mr. Branigh's motion for a new 
trial that his trial testimony was not accurate. (Supp. Tr., p.80, L.16 - p.81, L.9.) 
Beyond Mr. Peak's own acknowledgement, the record in this case shows demonstrably 
that Mr. Peak's testimony was false. During several of the recorded phone 
conversations between Mr. Peak and the former Sheriff, Mr. Dorion ended the 
conversation by telling Mr. Peak, "I love you"; and, on at least one occasion, Mr. Peak 
returned this sentiment. (Supp. Ex., pp.69-76.) Additionally, multiple interviews 
between Mr. Peak and a federal agent revealed the extent of this relationship. 
Mr. Peak had told the federal agent that his relationship with the former Sheriff 
was "very good," and that Mr. Dorion was a "father figure" for him. (Supp. Ex., pAS.) 
Former Sheriff Dorion let Mr. Peak drive his car and had arranged for Mr. Peak to live 
with him upon Mr. Peak's release from jail. (Supp. Ex., pAS.) Additionally, the former 
Sheriff engaged in a repeated pattern of permitting Mr. Peak unauthorized access to 
information from the law enforcement database used by the Nez Perce County Sheriff's 
Office. (Supp. Ex., ppAS-64.) The former Sheriff even, at times, kept Mr. Peak's 
criminal activities secret from other law enforcement officers and advised Mr. Peak as to 
how to avoid criminal liability for his charged offenses. (Supp. Ex., ppAS-64.) This is 
not evidence that shows a relationship of mere acquaintance, and this relationship very 
clearly extended beyond the fact that former Sheriff Dorion happened to have been a 
resource officer at Mr. Peak's high school. Accordingly, Mr. Peak's testimony at trial to 
that effect was false. 
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In addition, the prosecutor in this case knew or reasonably should have known 
that this was false testimony. From the outset, Mr. Spickler testified at the hearing on 
Mr. Branigh's motion for a new trial that he knew Mr. Peak was not telling the whole 
truth when he classified his relationship with former Sheriff Dorion as being merely one 
of acquaintance. (Supp. Tr., p.50, Ls.3-13.) Beyond this, evidence of the information 
provided by Mr. Spickler to a federal agent in connection with the investigation relating 
to the former Sheriff demonstrates that the prosecutor had fairly extensive knowledge 
as to the inappropriate relationship between Mr. Peak and former Sheriff Dorion. 
According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) report from Mr. Spickler's 
meeting with the federal agent, the agent arranged the meeting after an Idaho State 
Police officer was contacted by Mr. Spickler regarding the inappropriate relationship 
between Mr. Peak and the former Sheriff. (Supp. R., p.214.) During this meeting, the 
prosecutor voiced several concerns about allegations he had heard about former Sheriff 
Dorion. (Supp. R., p.214.) Mr. Peak was mentioned specifically by the prosecutor - in 
particular, Mr. Spickler stated that a number of people had spoken to him about the 
"close, personal relationship" between Mr. Peak and former Sheriff Dorion. (Supp. 
R., p.215.) Also noted in this report was the fact that, "LPD5 Officers have expressed 
great concern to Spickler about Peak's relationship with Dorion." (Supp. R., p.215.) In 
fact, Mr. Spickler's concerns were so significant that he agreed that the proper action 
based upon the reports he had received was to contact the Idaho State Attorney 
General's Office to request that they take over the matter for potential prosecution. 
(Supp. R., p.216.) 
5 "LPD" is an abbreviation used within the FBI report for the Lewiston Police 
Department. (Supp. R., p.215.) 
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Not only did Mr. Spickler knowingly fail to correct the false testimony tendered by 
Mr. Peak, the prosecutor instead vouched for Mr. Peak's credibility and the truthfulness 
of his testimony during closing arguments. The prosecutor characterized Mr. Peak as 
being, "as honest as he could be," during his testimony at trial. (Tr., p.1038, Ls.10-11.) 
Mr. Spickler further emphasized Mr. Peak's purported motive in giving his testimony at 
trial - i.e., that he was testifying only because "it's the right thing to do." (Tr., p.1038, 
L.14.) After noting that Mr. Peak had testified before the jury under oath, the prosecutor 
went on to state that, "there is no evidence that what Steven Peak said wasn't true, the 
evidence was exactly the opposite." (Tr., p.1 038, L.11 - p.1 039, L.8.) 
Finally, this perjured testimony was material to issues relating to Mr. Peak's 
credibility at trial, and therefore created a reasonable likelihood that the false testimony 
could have affected the judgment of the jury. Mr. Peak's testimony in this case was a 
critical component to the evidence against Mr. Branigh. The district court, in denying 
Mr. Branigh's motion for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the State's case, noted 
that the only evidence that could potentially directly link Mr. Branigh to the charged 
offense came through Mr. Peak's testimony. (Tr., p.911, Ls.22-24.) The prosecutor 
also emphasized Mr. Peak's testimony in closing arguments as filling a significant 
evidentiary gap in the State's case - Mr. Peak provided the only evidence that could 
connect Mr. Branigh to any firearm. (Tr., p.1 037, L.21 - p.1 038, L.2.) 
Moreover, Mr. Peak testified at trial as to several damaging admissions that 
Mr. Branigh had supposedly made regarding the charged offense. (Tr., p.879, L.24 -
p.880, L.1, p.884, LS.7 -24, p.885, Ls.2-9.) Given that there were no witnesses who 
actually saw Mr. Branigh at the scene of Mr. Johnston's shooting and no evidence that 
tied Mr. Branigh to any firearm aside from Mr. Peak's testimony, the credibility of 
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Mr. Peak was a crucial component of the State's evidence against Mr. Branigh and of 
the jury's assessment of his guilt. 
In sum, under clearly established case law, due process requires reversal of a 
conviction that is obtained by the State where the jury is presented with testimony that 
the prosecutor knew or should have known was false; and where the testimony was 
material, meaning that there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could 
have affected the judgment of the jury.6 Mr. Peak in this case presented false testimony 
that had direct and significant bearing on his credibility. The prosecutor in this case also 
knew or reasonably should have known that this testimony was false based upon 
reports from law enforcement officers as to the close and inappropriate relationship 
between Mr. Peak and former Sheriff Dorion. And there is a reasonable likelihood that 
this false information affected the jury's verdict given the centrality of Mr. Peak's 
testimony to the State's proof at trial and the corresponding importance of his credibility 
as a witness for the State. In light of this, Mr. Branigh submits that due process requires 
this Court to reverse his conviction and remand this case for a new trial. 
VI. 
The District Court Erred And Denied Mr. Branigh's Due Process Right To A Fair Trial 
When It Denied His Motion For A New Trial Based Upon The Brady Violation That 
Occurred In This Case 
A Introduction 
Mr. Branigh asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion for a 
6 This Court may wish to note that the test for materiality set forth in Sivak is virtually 
identical to the standard for prejudice under the three-part test set forth in Perry. Perry, 
150 Idaho at 226; Sivak, 134 Idaho at 649. Accordingly, because Mr. Branigh has 
established that the false testimony provided by Mr. Peak at trial was material - i.e., that 
there is a reasonably possibility that the testimony could have affected the jury - he has 
also demonstrated the requisite showing for prejudice under Perry. 
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new trial based upon the prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory impeachment 
evidence. Critically, the district court in this case found that Mr. Branigh had met all of 
the elements to establish a Brady violation, but thereafter erroneously determined that 
he was not entitled to a new trial based upon its conclusion that the remaining evidence 
- aside from the testimony of Mr. Peak - was sufficient to convict Mr. Branigh. This 
holding is clearly inconsistent with controlling case law from the United States Supreme 
Court. Because the district court failed to act in accordance with the constitutional 
standards governing its determination as to whether to grant a new trial based upon the 
due process violation in this case, Mr. Branigh asserts that this Court should reverse the 
district court's order denying his motion for a new trial. 
B. The District Court Erred And Denied Mr. Branigh's Due Process Right To A Fair 
Trial When It Denied His Motion For A New Trial Based Upon The Bradv 
Violation That Occurred In This Case 
From the outset, the district court in this case determined that, "[i]n the instant 
matter, Defendant Branigh has met his burden as to all three components of a Brady 
violation." (Supp. R, p.475.) The district court correctly found that the evidence relating 
to Mr. Peak's relationship with former Sheriff Dorion was "clearly impeachment 
evidence" because the evidence not disclosed to Mr. Branigh "provided Peak the 
opportunity to obtain confidential police investigation information from police sources 
rather than from fellow inmates." (Supp. R, p.475.) Likewise, the district court correctly 
found that this information was not disclosed to Mr. Branigh due to the prosecutor's 
erroneous belief that the evidence was immaterial, and despite the fact that Mr. Spickler 
was clearly aware of the investigation into the relationship between former Sheriff 
Dorion and Mr. Peak. (Supp. R, pp.475-476.) Finally, the district court correctly 
concluded that, "there can be little doubt that Branigh was prejudiced by the withholding 
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of evidence that carried such palpable impeachment value." (Supp. R., p.476.) 
Mr. Branigh concurs with this portion of the district court's analysis. 
However, rather than order a new trial based upon the finding that a Brady 
violation had occurred, the district court denied his request for a new trial based upon 
the conclusion that, "[w]hen the testimony of Stephen Peak is set aside, the remaining 
evidence presented by the State was more than sufficient for the jury to have reached a 
verdict of guilty." (Supp. R., pp.480-481.) Due to the court's view that the remaining 
evidence was sufficient, and therefore that Mr. Branigh had not demonstrated that he 
would have likely been acquitted in the absence of Mr. Peak's testimony, the district 
court held that Mr. Branigh had not established that the Brady violation found by the 
court merited a new trial. This was clear error. 
"The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes upon the 
government the duty to disclose evidence in its possession which, if revealed, would 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial." State v. Avelar, 124 Idaho 317, 321 (Ct. App. 
1993). The State's duty to disclose evidence applies to impeachment evidence as well 
as exculpatory evidence. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675. Impeachment evidence is 
"'favorable to the accused,' so that, if disclosed and used effectively, it may make the 
difference between conviction and acquittal." Id. (internal citations omitted). 
Suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused violates due 
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, regardless of 
the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. For purposes of 
determining whether a Brady violation has occurred, the terms "material" and 
"prejudicial" are used interchangeably. See United States v. Price, 566 F.3d 900, 911 
n.12 (9th Cir. 2009). 
49 
The obligation of the State to disclose favorable evidence to the defendant exists 
regardless of whether a defendant has specifically requested disclosure of the 
information from the State. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995). Accordingly, 
constitutional error results from the suppression of favorable evidence by the 
government "if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed 
to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. (quoting 
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682). 
The United States Supreme Court in Kyles took pains at several points in its 
Opinion to emphasize that the pertinent test for whether the failure of the State to 
disclose favorable evidence requires reversal on due process grounds is not whether 
the remaining evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction or that the disclosure of 
the suppressed evidence would have likely resulted in an acquittal. "Although the 
constitutional duty [of disclosure] is triggered by the potential impact of the favorable 
evidence, a showing of materiality does not require a demonstration by a 
preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted 
ultimately in the defendant's acquittal (whether based on the presence of reasonable 
doubt or acceptance of an explanation for the crime that does not inculpate the 
defendant)." Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434 (emphasis added). 
The district court's ruling in this case that Mr. Branigh met all of the elements to 
establish a Brady violation, but was not entitled to a new trial because the remaining 
evidence aside from Mr. Peak's testimony was sufficient to convict him and he had 
therefore not demonstrated that he would have likely been acquitted, runs directly afoul 
of the Kyles Opinion. (Supp. R., pp.480-481.) The Kyles Court held: 
Bagley's touchstone of materiality is a "reasonable probability" of a 
different result, and the adjective is important. The question is not 
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whether a defendant would have more likely than not received a 
different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he 
received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of 
confidence. A "reasonable probability" of a different result is accordingly 
shown when the government's evidentiary suppression "undermines 
confidence in the outcome of the trial." 
The second aspect of Bagley materiality bearing emphasis here is that it 
is not a sufficiency of the evidence test. The defendant need not 
demonstrate that after discounting the inculpatory evidence in light 
of the undisclosed evidence, there would not have been enough left 
to convict. The possibility of an acquittal on a criminal charge does not 
imply an insufficient evidentiary basis to convict. One does not show a 
Brady violation by demonstrating that some of the inculpatory evidence 
should have been excluded, but by showing that the favorable evidence 
could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in a different light as to 
undermine confidence in the verdict. 
Kyles, 514 U.S, at 434-435 (emphasis added); see also Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 
263, 289-290 (1999); Grube v, State, 134 Idaho 24, 28 (2000). 
It would appear that the district court in this case actually merged the statutory 
requirements for a new trial based upon I.C, § 19-2406 with the constitutional standards 
for when a new trial is required due to a Brady violation.? (Supp. R., pp.473-481.) 
However, these claims are analytically distinct - a claim of a Brady violation is rooted in 
the constitutional protections afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore the 
minimum standards established by the U.S, Supreme Court are controlling over when a 
new trial is required due to the constitutional violation. See Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 
972, 984-985 (9th Cir. 2005). In contrast, entitlement to a new trial under I.C. § 19-2406 
is a matter of statutory law - while Idaho may, by statute, provide additional grounds for 
which a defendant may be entitled to a new trial, it may not impose a higher standard of 
? Mr. Branigh alleged in the briefing in support of his motion for a new trial both that he 
should receive a new trial based upon the Brady violation that occurred in this case and 
because the evidence withheld by the State constituted newly discovered evidence 
justifying a new trial pursuant to I.C. § 19-2406(7). (Supp. R., pp.201-208.) 
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proof to establish a constitutional violation. See State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469, 471 
(2000) (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court establishes the "floor" of constitutional 
protection, although the states are free to adopt greater protection under their state 
constitutions); see a/so Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
In addition, Mr. Branigh actually pointed out to the district court that the court was 
erroneously applying the standards for a new trial under I.C. § 19-2406 to his claim of a 
Brady violation in his motion for reconsideration. (Supp. R., pp.492-494.) However, the 
district court denied this motion by reiterating that the court remained, "of the opinion 
that if the testimony of Stephen Peak was completely removed from the record, the 
remaining evidence is clearly sufficient to support the jury's verdict." (Supp. R., p.519.) 
The district court in this case found that Mr. Branigh had established all of the 
elements of a Brady violation. This should have ended the court's analysis, as once a 
violation of due process under the principles articulated in Brady has been established, 
the remedy is a new trial. However, the district court erroneously held that Mr. Branigh 
had not established a likelihood that he would have been acquitted and that there was 
sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction in the absence of Mr. Peak's testimony. 
Both points of the district court's analysis are directly in conflict with controlling U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, Mr. Branigh asks that this Court reverse the 
district court's order denying his motion for a new trial and remand this case for further 
proceedings. 
VII. 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Branigh's Motion For A New Trial Pursuant 
To I.C. § 19-2406 In Light Of Newly Discovered Evidence 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Branigh further asserts that the district court applied the incorrect legal 
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standards to his alternate request for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(7). Given that Mr. Peak recanted his trial testimony during 
the hearing on Mr. Branigh's motion for a new trial, Mr. Branigh contends that the district 
court should have applied the standards set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court in 
State v. Scroggins, 110 Idaho 380 (1985), in adjudicating his motion for a new trial. 
B. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Branigh's Motion For A New Trial 
Pursuant To I.C. § 19-2406 In Light Of Newly Discovered Evidence Because The 
District Court Failed To Apply The Correct Legal Standards To This Motion 
Idaho Code § 19-2406 enumerates the statutory grounds upon which a 
defendant may seek a new trial, and these grounds include where new evidence is 
discovered that is material to the defendant and which the defendant could not, with 
reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at trial. I.C. § 19-2604(7). 
Generally, motions for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence are governed 
by the four-part test articulated in State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 691 (1976). Under 
this test, a motion based on newly discovered evidence must establish: (1) that the 
evidence is newly discovered and was unknown to the defendant at the time of trial; (2) 
that the evidence is material, not merely cumulative or impeaching; (3) that it would 
probably produce an acquittal; and (4) that failure to learn of the evidence was due to no 
lack of diligence on the part of the defendant. Id. (quoting 2 C. Wright, Federal Practice 
and Procedure: Criminal § 557, at 515 (1969)). 
While the Drapeau test governs most motions seeking a new trial based upon 
newly discovered evidence, a different test applies where the "new evidence" at issue is 
the recantation by a trial witness of his or her prior trial testimony. In such cases, the 
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Idaho Supreme Court adopted the rationale of a Seventh Circuit case8 in holding that a 
motion for a new trial should be granted when: (1) a government witness's testimony is 
false; (2) without the false testimony, the jury might have reached a different result; and 
(3) the defendant did not know of, or could not adequately respond to, the false 
testimony at the time of trial. Scroggins, 110 Idaho at 384-385. Both the Idaho Court of 
Appeals and the Idaho Supreme Court have held that the Scroggins standard applies 
"when a trial witness has recanted his or her trial testimony and evidence of that 
recantation has been presented to the trial court." Ellington, 151 Idaho at 73; State v. 
Griffith, 144 Idaho 356, 366 (Ct. App. 2007). 
Among the differences between the Drapeau and Scroggins standards is that the 
former precludes a new trial unless a different result is 'probable,' while the latter 
requires only that a different result is possible. See Griffith, 144 Idaho at 366 ; State v. 
Barlow, 113 Idaho 573, 578 (Ct. App. 1987); State v. Lawrence, 112 Idaho 149, 152 
(Ct. App. 1986). Obviously then, the Scroggins standard imposes a less onerous 
burden on the defendant seeking a new trial than does the Drapeau standard. This less 
exacting standard of prejudice is due to the fact that false testimony "affects the integrity 
of the judicial process in a way that overlooked testimony does not." Lawrence, 112 
Idaho at 151. Additionally, under the Scroggins standard, there is no requirement that 
the testimony that is recanted be material rather than impeaching, as is required under 
the Drapeau test. Scroggins, 110 Idaho at 384-385; Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691. 
8 The case relied upon by the Court in Scroggins was Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 
82 (7th Cir. 1928). Although Larrison was overruled by the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit in United States v. Mitrione, 357 F.3d 712, 718 (7th Cir. 2004), no Idaho 
court has repudiated the Scroggins standard. See, e.g., Griffith, 144 Idaho at 365-67, 
161 P.3d at 684-86 (recognizing the continued viability of Scroggins even after the 
Seventh Circuit's overruling of Larrison). 
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In this case, Mr. Peak, in his testimony at the hearing on Mr. Branigh's motion for 
a new trial, repudiated his prior testimony at trial regarding the nature of his relationship 
with former Sheriff Dorion. At trial, Mr. Peak classified his relationship with the former 
Sheriff as mere acquaintances who were only known to one another through the fact 
that Mr. Dorion was a resource officer at Mr. Peak's school. (Tr., p.890, L.24 - p.891, 
L.2.) However, Mr. Peak admitted at the hearing on Mr. Branigh's motion for a new trial 
that they were more than acquaintances and that his testimony to that effect at 
Mr. Branigh's trial was not the full truth. (Supp. Tr., p.80, L.16 - p.81, L.9.) In fact, he 
testified at this hearing that he and former Sheriff Dorion had a personal relationship -
Mr. Peak admitted that he spoke frequently with the then-Sheriff while he was 
incarcerated; that he had asked former Sheriff Dorion for numerous favors, most notably 
for assistance in seeking to avoid criminal consequences for Mr. Peak's offenses; that 
the former Sheriff had permitted Mr. Peak personal access to the law enforcement 
database over a dozen times; that Mr. Peak and Mr. Dorion had discussed 
Mr. Branigh's case in particular "several times"; and that the two maintained a close 
enough relationship to exchange sentiments of love at the end of their phone 
conversations. (Supp. Tr., p.81, L.5 - p.90, L.17.) 
The testimony by Mr. Peak at the hearing on Mr. Branigh's motion for a new trial 
constitutes a recantation of his prior trial testimony regarding the nature of his 
relationship with former Sheriff Dorion. Accordingly, the district court should have 
applied the standards set forth in Scroggins when adjudicating Mr. Branigh's motion for 
a new trial as it related to I.C. § 19-2406(7). However, the court did not do so and 
instead relied upon the standards contained within the Drapeau test. (Supp. R., pp.477-
481.) The district court's error in failing to apply the Scroggins test was crucial to the 
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court's disposition of Mr. Branigh's motion for a new trial, as both grounds upon which 
the district court denied the motion are areas of divergence between the Scroggins and 
Drapeau tests. 
While the district court correctly found that the evidence regarding the 
relationship between Mr. Peak and the former Sheriff was newly discovered and was 
unknown to Mr. Branigh at the time of trial, and that the failure to learn of the evidence 
was not due to a lack of diligence on Mr. Branigh's part, the court denied Mr. Branigh's 
motion because it found that this evidence was merely impeaching and because 
Mr. Branigh had not shown that it was likely that this evidence would have produced an 
acquittal. (Supp. R., pp.477-481.) However, under the test articulated in Scroggins, 
there is no requirement that the evidence subject to the witness' recantation be 
sUbstantive rather than material. Scroggins, 110 Idaho at 384-385. Additionally, a 
defendant under the Scroggins standard need not demonstrate a reasonable probability 
of an acquittal due to the newly discovered evidence - the mere possibility of a different 
result is sufficient. Id. 
Where the district court fails to apply the proper standards to its determination of 
whether to grant a new trial, and, in particular, fails to apply the standards articulated in 
Scroggins where the new evidence is the recantation of trial testimony by a witness, the 
proper remedy is to vacate the district court's denial of the motion for a new trial and to 
remand the case for further proceedings under the proper legal standards. Lawrence, 
112 Idaho at 153. "When a judge exercises a discretionary function, such as ruling on a 
motion for a new trial, and in doing so he applies an incorrect legal standard, the proper 
appellate response is to vacate the ruling and remand the case for reconsideration." Id. 
As such, Mr. Branigh asks that this Court vacate the district court's order denying his 
56 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 3rd day of July, 2012, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, by causing to be placed a copy thereof in 
the U.S. Mail, addressed to: 
LEOTIS BRANNON BRANIGH III 
INMATE #42023 
ICC 
PO BOX 70010 
BOISE 1083707 
JEFF M BRUDIE 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
CHARLES E KOVIS 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
PO BOX 83720 
BOISE 10 83720-0010 
Hand delivered to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court. 
JMC/eas 
58 
motion for a new trial and remand his case for further proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Branigh requests that his judgment of conviction be vacated and his case 
remanded for further proceedings. Alternatively, he requests that the district court's 
order denying his motion for a new trial be reversed and his case remanded for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this 3rd day of July, 2012. 
JUS IN M. CURTIS 
qeputyState Appellate Public Defender 
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